久久九九撸处女穴亚州,欧美一级黄片视频,免费A级毛片AV无码-AV

　　最近美國信用報(bào)告公司(CRC)的國會(huì)聽證會(huì)再次成為消費(fèi)者信貸市場的焦點(diǎn)，市場和監(jiān)管改革已經(jīng)是燃眉之急。一年半前發(fā)生的Equifax數(shù)據(jù)泄露事件導(dǎo)致近1.5億消費(fèi)者的個(gè)人信息遭到泄露，該事件使得信用報(bào)告公司的業(yè)務(wù)運(yùn)行、監(jiān)管和潛在的改革重新被提上議程。

　　信用報(bào)告本質(zhì)上是一種商品業(yè)務(wù)，這里的商品是數(shù)據(jù)。數(shù)十年來，信息經(jīng)紀(jì)人將原始信貸數(shù)據(jù)轉(zhuǎn)化為銀行和其他信貸機(jī)構(gòu)需要的信息增值產(chǎn)品，從而使信用報(bào)告公司獲利頗豐。然而，這種模式已經(jīng)被打破了 —— 這個(gè)行業(yè)在處理對貸方和消費(fèi)者同樣敏感的信息方面普遍缺乏風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理。

　　信用報(bào)告公司具有令人羨慕的商業(yè)模式。他們免費(fèi)從銀行和其他貸方機(jī)構(gòu)獲得個(gè)人信用信息，并作為回報(bào)將該數(shù)據(jù)和其他數(shù)據(jù)產(chǎn)品批發(fā)或零售給貸方和個(gè)人。

　　從表面上看，這種商業(yè)模式似乎令人難以置信，但它的根源可以追溯到信息時(shí)代和云計(jì)算之前。幾十年前，信用信息在一個(gè)相對巴爾干化分裂的市場內(nèi)交換。隨著時(shí)間的推移，零售商和其他信貸方開始合作，互相提供其消費(fèi)者信用記錄數(shù)據(jù)。逐漸地，三個(gè)大型信用報(bào)告公司(Equifax，Experian和TransUnion)形成規(guī)模，開始為美國和全球客戶提供信用報(bào)告。

　　美國《公平信用報(bào)告法(the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FCRA)》的出臺(tái)進(jìn)一步鞏固了信用報(bào)告公司的地位，它要求機(jī)構(gòu)提供準(zhǔn)確的消費(fèi)者信用信息報(bào)告，而較小機(jī)構(gòu)可能無力提供。從歷史上看，由于一系列監(jiān)管、技術(shù)和業(yè)務(wù)相關(guān)問題，銀行和其他貸方尚未發(fā)掘直接投資信貸數(shù)據(jù)和系統(tǒng)巨大的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值。因此，他們往往全權(quán)委托信用報(bào)告公司處理。

　　1. 監(jiān)管和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理不足

　　Over time CRCs, grew in scale and scope. But, unfortunately, their risk management practices and regulatory oversight did not keep up with this growth. The FCRA designated the Federal Trade Commission with primary oversight (if you can call it that) over the CRCs. Lamentably, compared with the level of regulatory oversight in banking, the FTC's oversight of CRCs was – and is – wholly inadequate.

　　Although the CRCs manage some of the most important and sensitive data for millions of individuals worldwide, they operate with little rigor with respect to risk governance and industry standard risk management practices. Indeed, according to their websites and annual reports, the CRCs do not feature a chief risk officer among their top executives. Moreover, their boards lack risk committees.

　　The concept of risk governance, such as the “three lines of defense” doctrine, also appears to be generally lacking among the CRCs. For instance, at Equifax, among the CFO's duties are audit functions – clearly a responsibility that would call attention to any large bank with a similar CFO role. It seems only natural that in light of the Equifax data breach, any reform of the CRCs must require robust risk management practices be put in place to protect consumers.

　　2. 不要忘記FICO風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

　　Even though it's critically important to the credit-granting process, FICO – the software vendor that provides credit scores to each of the three CRCs – is another key market participant that goes relatively unnoticed in discussions of consumer credit information reform. The developers of FICO (also known as Fair Isaac) have essentially exerted an unregulated monopoly over credit grantors for decades, and their credit scores have become ubiquitous in the market as a result. Moreover, each CRC has its own version of FICO, which adds another dimension of confusion and over-engineering into the credit process for lenders and consumers.

　　FICO scores are based on statistical models leveraging millions of consumers' detailed credit history information. In the years following the financial crisis, model risk management regulatory oversight and practices strengthened – but those improvements did not apply directly to FICO.

　　To be sure, banks perform their own testing of FICO and its variants as an input to bank consumer models; however, FICO is not required to undergo the same level of model risk management and validation as would be found, for instance, in the OCC's 2011-12 model validation guidance.

　　As important as they are to bank lending activities and beyond, it only seems natural that FICO and the CRCs undergo the same level of testing and oversight required by the primary industry users of their scores.

　　3. 一些其他思考

　　Given the importance of consumer credit information and credit scores in lending decisions, a logical argument can be made for the CFPB becoming the primary regulator of the CRCs and FICO. Banks, meanwhile, should reevaluate the strategic value of credit data for several reasons. Breaking the CRCs' stranglehold on credit data would reduce the cost of this critical information to banks and provide more accessibility to nontraditional and existing sources of credit data, enabling banks to make better-informed credit portfolio decisions.

　　Today, the cost for a bank to pull updated credit attribute data for loans in their portfolio can be extremely expensive (based on what the CRCs charge for credit archive extracts), which prevents many firms from marking their credit portfolios to market on an ongoing basis.

　　As the primary contributors of credit, lenders and other credit grantors should establish their own CRC market utility. This would essentially “starve” the CRCs out of existence over time.

　　The result would be a much better outcome for lenders and consumers alike.A single credit repository coupled with a single credit score would bring greater transparency to the market, reduce costs and, most importantly, improve the risk management of the credit reporting and data management process.

　　在今日錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜、瞬息萬變的金融市場上，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)往往難以掌握。有效管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并從中獲取利潤成為金融企業(yè)成功的重要關(guān)鍵。

　　而這一攸關(guān)企業(yè)組織及其投資人命運(yùn)的重要決策，需要眾多的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理專業(yè)人士(Financial Risk Professionals)的參與，故FRM日益受到重視，已儼然成為全球矚目的國際風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理證照。

　　在國內(nèi)，F(xiàn)RM正日益受到國家金融監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)以及各家金融機(jī)構(gòu)的重視。對于金融監(jiān)管層，中國人民銀行和中國銀監(jiān)會(huì)均把金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、維系金融穩(wěn)定作為銀行監(jiān)管的重中之重。

　　對于大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)，中國工商銀行、中國建設(shè)銀行、中國銀行等國有商業(yè)銀行紛紛將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理作為貫穿整個(gè)銀行經(jīng)營的核心。

　　同時(shí)，各大證券公司也對金融市場的資產(chǎn)定價(jià)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理高度重視。因此，金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)專業(yè)人員的需求日益壯大。

FRM培訓(xùn)課程詳情在線咨詢